

INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG  
FORUM ON PREVENTING  
NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE



## **PREVENTING THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON USE IN COMBAT ACTIONS IN UKRAINE**

Proceedings of the Online Conference  
of the International Luxembourg Forum  
on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Moscow, June 21





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**2022**

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The booklet contains proceedings of the Online Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe “Preventing the Possibility of Nuclear Weapon Use in Combat Actions in Ukraine” that took place on June 21, 2022. The discussion was attended by a number of world-renowned scholars, experts, public figures and government officials.

The official website of the International Luxembourg Forum: [www.luxembourgforum.org](http://www.luxembourgforum.org)

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# Vladimir DVORKIN

## *Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum<sup>1</sup>*

**W**e planned a conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on the subject “Preventing the Possibility of Nuclear Weapons Use in Combat Actions in Ukraine”, while expecting, firstly, the publication of an unclassified version of the new Nuclear Posture Review announced in March. The Review directly states that nuclear weapons are intended to deter a nuclear attack against the United States, allies and partners, and that the United States will consider the possibility of using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, to protect vital interests of the United States and its allies. Secondly, we expected that we would get some additional information about Russia’s policy in this area.

However, the uncertainty in the policies of the two nuclear superpowers remains. Therefore, we decided not to wait for updated information.

President Joe Biden, when he was vice president, stated in 2017, in the Carnegie Foundation, that he and President Obama “are firmly convinced that we have achieved enough progress in order to make sure that deterrence and, if necessary, response action against a

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<sup>1</sup> Professor, Ph.D., Major General (ret.), former Director of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

nuclear attack should be the only purpose of the US nuclear arsenal.” However, the possibility that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances, to protect vital interests of the United States and its allies, could be regarded as a retreat from this sole purpose of the nuclear arsenal because extreme circumstances could be interpreted in many ways. For example, massive strategic cyberattacks that could paralyze the functioning of the main, vital sectors of the economy, or some other actions. It is possible that the delay in the publication of the unclassified Nuclear Posture Review is related to the difficult circumstances, including in Ukraine. We have been following very closely the debate in the United States on a transformation of this sole purpose of the nuclear arsenal.

In the Russian military doctrine, the formula is defined more clearly. It authorizes the use of nuclear weapons in case of nuclear attack against Russia, or with conventional warfare if the very existence of the Russian state is threatened. However, the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations state that in the context of escalating military conflict the demonstration of readiness and determination to use force, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, is an effective deterrent factor, and in fact this contradicts what is stated in the Russian military doctrine [1].

That is what pertains to the doctrine. But over the past few years, and particularly over the past few months, statements of leaders and influential experts about the possibility of nuclear weapons use, have been quite frequent, and this is alarming. It is generally recognized that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons after their almost tenfold reduction as a result of the implementation of the START treaties and the unilateral reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons has become greater, not less. There are several reasons for that, and we have analyzed them at our previous conferences. And all this contrasts sharply with the Gorbachev-Reagan formula that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that is repeated time and again



almost as a law. On June 16, Foreign Minister Lavrov repeated this formula in St Petersburg.

The Gospel of John says, “In the beginning was the Word...”. If only words had been the beginning of everything else, helping implement the above-mentioned formula. But this is not the case, and instead we hear too many other words.

The Russian leadership regards the US lend-lease program and weapons supplies to Ukraine by many NATO countries to fight the Russian armed forces as a serious threat. When, for example, President Putin warned that Russia’s response would be lightning-fast, he hardly meant conventional weapons, such as multiple rocket launchers, aviation, tanks and artillery. The possibility of nuclear weapons use is also mentioned quite often in Europe. Recently Poland even suggested to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons. A nuclear explosion can be used in many ways, including as a warning, demonstration, at high altitude. Assessments differ depending on the outcome of military action in Ukraine, on who will gain the upper hand. Assuming, for example, that the operation will be protracted and lead to mutual attrition, then the probability of nuclear weapons use would increase.

Previously, we planned to analyze the situation in the Middle East as well, because the Vienna negotiations on the nuclear deal with Iran have been deadlocked. Iran turns off IAEA monitoring cameras, increases uranium enrichment. Experts have been warning for a long time that Iran needs just one or two months to create its first nuclear warhead. More than several years have passed. The United States and Israel firmly declare that they will not allow Iran to build nuclear weapons. What can all this lead to? What do members of the Forum’s Supervisory Board and the Advisory Council think about this?

Nevertheless, the main priority today is related to Ukraine, but not exclusively. At all of our conferences we suggest recommendations agreed upon by the participants to address difficult problems. It would make sense to maintain this practice. I believe we could tentatively focus on three main points that we can propose in order to achieve

the purpose of our conference, and that is to prevent the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

First, the purpose of the nuclear arsenals, not just of Russia and the United States, but of other nuclear states, should be deterrence of nuclear attack and, if necessary, a response. So that deterrence – and, if necessary, response – could be regarded as the sole purpose of national nuclear arsenals. I emphasize: this is the sole purpose of the nuclear states' arsenals, because the consequences of any other extreme action are not comparable with the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Second, something that we have been reiterating for many years, and this is what Sam Nunn firmly advocates for. In order to avoid errors of the early warning systems, misinterpretation of the information received from these systems and from other sources, the time for response decision-making must be increased. This is possible without any loss of control because the high command authority has backup channels for making such decisions.

Finally, the third point I would like to emphasize is the adoption of a political, strategic, and organizational and technological solution that would make it impossible for a single person to make a decision and employ nuclear weapons. There are procedures in nuclear states for taking such decisions, but they do not rule out the possibility of a single-person decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that single-person decision-making is excluded.

These tenets should be adopted by the official members of the Nuclear Club, the five nuclear states: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China, and then extended to India, Pakistan and Israel.

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[1] The Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted on July 31, 2022, does not mention the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

# Robert LEGVOLD

*Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus,  
Department of Political Science  
and the Harriman Institute, Columbia University<sup>2</sup>*

**T**hroughout the history of the Luxembourg Forum, we have focused on fundamental nuclear issues, including the role of arms control and measures contributing to greater strategic stability in a nuclear world. That conversation has been very important, but it has also been somewhat abstract. Suddenly actuality is upon us – the actual is real and the threats that it raises are urgent. The public space is filled with worried discussions about the prospect of nuclear weapons being used. Recently the US television network CBS, on its web page, carried a long article on whether and when President Putin might use a nuclear weapon. After decades when the publics in both of our countries had stopped worrying or, indeed, thinking about nuclear war, that fear is again stirring. US and UK government authorities, however, say that there have been no operational preparations for nuclear use on the Russian side at any point in the Ukrainian war. In addition, US and Russian experts largely agree that the use of a nuclear weapon at this point in the war is very unlikely. But what is different is that even for them it is no longer unthinkable.

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<sup>2</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D.

Second, it turns out that the new actuality is a good deal messier on two levels than our conventional thinking anticipated. In terms of formal doctrine, Russia's publicly declared position is that nuclear weapons will be used in only one of four circumstances, the last one of which would be if in a conventional war the very existence of the Russian state was threatened. Reality, however, as I noted, is far messier. Listen to what President Putin said in his February 24th speech: "The United States is creating a hostile anti-Russia next to Russia and in Russia's historic land. For the United States and its allies, it's a policy of containing Russia, with obvious geopolitical dividends. For our country it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation. This is not an exaggeration; this is a fact. It is not only a very real threat to our interests, but to the *very existence of our state* and to its sovereignty." So, in reality how reassuring is the seemingly high bar for nuclear use specified in formal doctrine?

The second way in which reality complicates our prior thinking is with respect to the parameters within which we argue over the notion of "escalate to de-escalate." The United States assumes—I think, quite wrongly—that Russia intends to use tactical nuclear weapons in a war of aggression. In truth, both countries have long had what might be called defensive "escalate to de-escalate" operational concepts. In the present Ukrainian context, there is no military rationale for the use of a tactical nuclear weapon or sub-strategic nuclear weapon, but that does not dispose of a potential political reason for their use. Experts in the West take seriously the possibility that Russia might fire a tactical nuclear weapon over open space or over the sea to show resolve. Or, more ominously, they worry that, if the war goes badly for Russia, its leadership could be tempted to use a nuclear weapon against a population center as a means of political coercion. This, the Russian side might argue, parallels what the United States did with atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Third, the risk that the current proxy war in Ukraine could turn into a hot war between the United States/NATO and Russia, with the

danger, as President Biden has said, of unleashing World War III, raises challenges at two levels. First is the question of how we get there? What are the pathways to an outcome this tragic? The challenge at the second level is where reality confronts theory. That is, when in such a case the nuclear threshold is crossed, how good are our theories about managing a nuclear conflict; how realistic are the assumptions underlying current US and Russian nuclear doctrine and strategy? Both of our countries have refocused their attention on enhancing so-called limited nuclear options and on developing strategies for executing them along with the weapons systems serving them. How would all this work, other than ending in catastrophe, were one or both sides in the Ukrainian war to cross the nuclear threshold? I fear that senior policy makers, defense establishments, and even we within the Luxembourg Forum have failed to focus on the risks of inadvertent nuclear war and the problem of escalation control when both of our countries and potentially China believe “limited nuclear options” make nuclear war feasible.

The final point I would make is for the future agenda of the Luxembourg Forum. All of what I have just said raises the urgent question of pathways to de-escalation. When President Putin in March ordered a “special regime of combat duty” for Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the Biden administration canceled a previously scheduled ICBM test. That’s a kind of de-escalation. But are we thinking seriously enough about de-escalation in more comprehensive terms in a circumstance like today’s? Systematic thinking about de-escalatory steps in a crisis where the risk of a use of a nuclear weapon is real seems to me a natural complement to what has been our major focus on arms control.

In terms of a joint statement that the Luxembourg Forum might issue after this meeting, I would propose that it have three parts. The first part would express our deep concern over loose or casual language concerning nuclear weapons and their use, and then urge the leadership in both countries to focus on more constructive

language, such as an assurance that nuclear weapons serve a “sole purpose.” There are reasons why, in the broader context of its security commitments to third parties, the United States would find this difficult, but if both leaderships embraced the notion, it would not only reduce the damage done by loose talk but be genuinely stabilizing in US-Russian nuclear relations. The United States should be interested in having Russia commit to sole purpose, given the active dangers raised by the Ukrainian war. For the same reason, it would be useful if both leaderships specifically reaffirm their support for the P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

The second part of the statement might focus on the urgency of the two sides exploring steps to prevent potential escalation across the nuclear threshold—that is, on de-escalatory measures. These might be along the lines of Alexey Arbatov’s suggestion that red lines be clearly specified. We would need to decide whether to frame the point very generally or to be more specific and offer concrete illustrations.

The third part might incorporate the importance of resuming a strategic dialogue. Even if this cannot be a full-scale return to the strategic stability dialogue agreed to at the June 2021 Geneva Summit with the two working groups launched afterwards, it is urgent that the two governments engage in talks about strategic stability that takes account of the dangers in the Ukrainian war.

# William PERRY

*Professor, Stanford University*<sup>3</sup>

I want to make four quick and simple points about my concerns. The last which will have to do with nuclear, and I will focus most of my discussion on the last point, the nuclear point.

My first concern about the situation in Ukraine today is that, as a principle, Russia does not recognize a state that's recognized by the UN. Says it's not a real nation. And I think it's not for Russia to decide that, it's for the UN to decide that.

Secondly, it's using military force to seize land from another nation. That really hasn't happened seriously since World War II. And that's a matter of great concern.

Third, it implies the use of nuclear weapons for reasons other than deterrence. And that's my main concern. That's what I want to talk mainly about.

I believe that both Russia and the United States should make very specific and direct statements on the limited use of nuclear weapons in the world, that neither one of them would use, and the nuclear weapons would be used for nuclear deterrence only. Specifically, not used to threaten another nation, and not used for any other reason except that.

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<sup>3</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D., former United States Secretary of Defense.

The danger and the real danger we are facing today is in the loose talk that's going on, that that loose talk could somehow get translated, escalated into action. Now, I believe, and I seriously believe, that the risk of a nuclear war, a nuclear catastrophe, has gone much, much higher in the last few months. I would say, maybe by a factor of 10 over what it was a year ago. And I think that the incursion in Ukraine has been the reason for that, and the language about the use of nuclear weapons that is associated with that. That is the thing that I think this group should focus on, which is the talk, the loose talk, or implications of the use of nuclear weapons, and what has it done to greatly increase the possibility that nuclear weapons would actually be used and that we would actually slide ourselves into a nuclear catastrophe.



# Alexey ARBATOV

*Head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO<sup>4</sup>*

**N**owadays the world is nearer to a nuclear catastrophe than at any time after 1945, except for the 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Comparing the situation today with that in October 1962, it should be recognized that it is fortunate that there are no nuclear missiles or nuclear weapons in Ukraine. We should thank nuclear arms control for that, which is something that people have forgotten about. Meanwhile the INF treaty, and START I treaty, and other treaties have contributed to the withdrawal of thousands of nuclear munitions from the territory of Ukraine. If they had remained there, we might have crossed the threshold of war and nuclear conflagration long ago.

The second point is also associated with arms control, which is not presently remembered by anybody. During the Cuban crisis, the United States had an overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, and it could deal a devastating strike on the Soviet Union without receiving a retaliation. This left the USSR the only possibility to avoid unilateral defeat – preemptive strike, including a strike by missiles deployed in Cuba in response to a US air raid, preplanned two days

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<sup>4</sup> Deputy Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum, Academician RAS, former Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma.

later than the date when a compromise was reached by Kennedy and Khrushche. Presently we have a situation when no side can deliver a disarming nuclear strike against the other side and in contrast to October 1962, neither party is afraid of strategic first strike or preemption. Again, it is largely the results of arms control treaties and strategic stability which have been forged during the ensuing decades.

In the dire and bleak situation of today, this is one of very few good news. However, the bad news is that not only the tragic and dramatic situation in Ukraine is still unfolding without any visible light in the end of the tunnel, but also the possibility of nuclear war because of escalation of combat actions remains possible and quite high. Without getting into various possible scenarios of such escalation, it is worthwhile to underline that the use of nuclear weapons in or around Ukraine is not possible offhand, all of a sudden. It is only possible in case of an escalation that leads to a direct armed conflict between Russia and NATO, which may be followed by the use of nuclear weapons.

Of course, the best way to prevent such a scenario is to reach an agreement on a ceasefire and start negotiations on peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, until that happens there is an urgent need to take measures to prevent escalation of the conflict. In fact, some rules are implicitly observed, and they may serve as basis for an informal understanding of what must not be done, no matter how acute the contradictions are. First, there should be no use of any nuclear weapon or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and all nuclear power plants should be totally exempted from combat actions.

The second rule is noninvolvement of NATO directly in the fighting in Ukraine. On the part of Russia: no strikes against the NATO countries and no expansion of the conflict into NATO territory, despite the fact that it is used for storing and transporting a huge amount of weapons and military hardware to Ukraine. Third, no strikes should be implemented against Crimea or Russia proper, and as a guarantee, log-range offensive weapons should not be delivered to Ukraine. (The

precedent of President Biden's decision against supplying ATACMS missiles to Ukraine is very important and should be observed in the future).

It is easy to foresee vehement objections to these proposals from the proponents of Ukrainian victory, crushing defeat of Russia and retribution for its "special military operation". Likewise, passionate protests would come from the Russian supporters of the war till decisive victory - no matter what means are used and costs incurred.

Nonetheless, unwavering pursuit of either of the two goals is the most assured way to provoke an escalation to a nuclear war. This will most probably destroy our civilization and make the issue of victory or defeat in Ukraine, its membership in NATO or neutrality - totally irrelevant in view of what in this case is in store for humanity. On the other hand, if the escalation is avoided, then (besides preventing all concurrent calamities) the door will be kept open for subsequent ceasefire and peace negotiations.

In order to prevent escalation there should be established a permanent channel of communications between top military and, desirably, political leaders of Russia and NATO and an implicit understanding of certain rules of conduct. By the way, it is one of the most important lessons to be learned from the Cuban crisis, which was subsequently embodied in the establishment of the "Hot Line" and arms control process and agreements, as well as confidence-building measures and deconflicting mechanism (in Syria).

Finally, one more recommendation is that Russian and US presidents should themselves have a precise understanding and publicly clarify as much as possible the nuclear doctrines of the two sides to avoid mutual misperceptions and miscalculations. As the experience demonstrates, ambiguity does not fortify deterrence, at least when emanating from nuclear superpowers. On the contrary - in peacetime, this fuels the arms race and in a crisis time, it may provoke uncontrolled escalation and inadvertent nuclear war. Moreover, there should be an open mutual understanding that only the responsible

heads of state and their designated representatives are authorized to make statements on nuclear doctrines and possibility of using nuclear weapons. Anybody else – politicians, experts, let alone journalists – must be forbidden playing with such subjects.

# William POTTER

## *Director of the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies<sup>5</sup>*

I have three points to make that I believe are relevant to our discussion.

The first point concerns the Reagan-Gorbachev principle that a war cannot be won and must never be fought. I recently returned from a meeting of heads of national delegations in advance of the NPT Review Conference to be held in New York this August. I was struck by the cynicism on the part of most of the states who were participating in the meeting regarding the P5 statement that was made in early January 2022 reiterating the Reagan-Gorbachev principle. They see this statement as simply words that are not matched by behavior as evidenced by the war in Ukraine. And those words are further diluted by the fact, as far as they can tell and as far as I can tell, that when Russian media personalities make jokes about the firing of a Poseidon that unleashes a tsunami that wipes out all of the United Kingdom, or missiles that are directed at Europe and in 30 minutes or less destroy all of Europe and there is no critical commentary, as best as I can tell, from the likes of those around the room here or other knowledgeable experts

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5 Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Non-Proliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Foreign Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

who have the opportunity to speak frequently on Russian television. This reinforces a very real credibility gap. And so I think it behooves all of us to speak out, not necessarily against the war, because I do realize the difficulties of doing so in Russia, but at least to call attention to the absurdity of these animated films and the notion that it's a laughing matter to launch nuclear weapons, because it undermines the very principles that all of us have been trying to promote.

The second point I would make is that I attend many of meetings of this sort and I am disturbed to hear both Russians and especially Americans engage in what appears to be to be wishful thinking that somehow we are going almost automatically to experience a post-Cuban Missile-like Crisis situation in which suddenly new and improved arms control becomes possible. I believe this is wishful thinking because what we have at the moment is not only the collapse and diminished integrity of much of our arms control infrastructure, but we also are witnessing the very serious erosion of crucial norms against nuclear weapons use. While it may be possible after this horrendous situation to restore some elements of dialogue between our countries, I don't believe this will occur automatically or quickly lead to the rebuilding of these norms, which will take decades at least to restore.

The last point I will make again involves the NPT. I believe there is an opportunity that I do not observe elsewhere, for the United States and Russia, and perhaps also China, to engage on the margins of the NPT Review Conference in August in informal conversations related to strategic stability. In this regard, I was encouraged by the public message that President Biden delivered to the Arms Control Association at their recent anniversary conference. He noted the very difficult circumstances in which we find ourselves, but also indicated that it was important for the United States and Russia to resume strategic stability talks. I regard his statement as one of the few positive signs in the US-Russian nuclear relationship, and I would hope that on an informal basis some discussions can be begun quietly at the NPT Review Conference in August.

# Roald SAGDEEV

*Distinguished Professor of the Department  
of Physics at the University of Maryland<sup>6</sup>*

**G**eneral Dvorkin suggested in a very practical way that we should concentrate on a few very short and strong statements, recommendations.

There is no problem with the formulation of the first two points, about the uniqueness of the situation when nuclear weapons could be considered - the first point, and the second is the increase of the time to make a decision for the response.

There are also some minor stylistic doubts, but there may be some deeper problem here.

When we are talking about avoiding a situation where someone can make a singular decision for the response, it immediately gives us a hint of who we have in mind. Can we reformulate this suggestion, by suggesting that the procedures of making decisions, collective decisions, should be reconsidered and adopted by the members of the Nuclear Club? It has the same meaning, but the language is slightly different.

A few words about the escalation of rhetoric. A very important element of what we are talking about is what we call “de-escalation”.

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<sup>6</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Academician RAS.

De-escalation of rhetoric, mass-media statements, should be included in this proposal. When talking to different audiences here in the United States, and sometimes abroad, I am asked a lot of questions, and when we are using, for example, rhetoric of paradise versus hell, some people will ask me, “Isn’t it borrowed from the rhetoric of hard, fundamental Islamists?”

This type of suggestions should be also included as a part of de-escalation. And I fully agree with Academician Arbatov’s definition, his comment on the completely unacceptable atmosphere created by official TV programs in Russia.



# Viktor ESIN

*Research Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies of National Security of Russia, Expert Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics<sup>7</sup>*

**T**he good news is that today's situation is quite different from that in October 1962, when the Caribbean Crisis as we call it here, or the Cuban Missile Crisis, as they call it in the United States, happened. The bad news is that the current situation can and may slide into a similar crisis because the United States and NATO stated that they would not allow Russia to win and achieve its goals in Ukraine. In its turn, Russia cannot afford to lose and thereby admit its defeat. That is why I agree with Vladimir Dvorkin that steps need to be taken to prevent the possibility of nuclear weapons employment in the context of predicted development of the operation in Ukraine. His proposed steps are to increase the time for decision-making and exclude sole decision-making authority on military response. Those are subjective political decisions. In this context, it is important – as Bill Perry suggested – that all heads of state, and in particular leaders of Russia and the United States, make a clear statement concerning the use of nuclear weapons, in order to avoid various interpretations

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<sup>7</sup> Member of the International advisory council of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D., Colonel General (ret.), former Chief of Staff – First Deputy Commander-in-Chief at Strategic Missile Forces.

that we hear from some administration officials, both in Washington and Moscow. Not only should they reaffirm the statement made this January 3 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, but also clearly explain each party's doctrine regarding nuclear weapons employment. I see it as a top-priority, a critical step that does not require any approvals, and with political will and responsible political approach, the presidents of the United States and Russia could make such statements unilaterally.

Other proposals made by Vladimir Dvorkin and the conference participants need to be elaborated further. But this requires relevant communication between the parties. Sadly, today Washington and Moscow are not in contact. By the way, even during the Cuban Missile Crisis they stayed in touch. Both parties understood that without communication they could not reach a compromise and avoid a nuclear war. Today, we are facing a very dangerous situation where the leaders in Moscow and Washington have stopped communicating and are blaming each other for that. There is no point in playing the blame game, but both Moscow and Washington must understand that the communication process is of critical importance. Otherwise, the situation can get out of control should anything unexpected happen, and – as Alexey Arbatov said – escalate into a direct military confrontation leading to a nuclear conflict.

# Igor IVANOV

## *President of the Russian International Affairs Council*<sup>8</sup>

**O**n February 16, I published an article saying that Russia's military operation in Ukraine is impossible. I was wrong. It started on February 24. Today, unfortunately, we are in a situation where it is easy to make mistakes, and seemingly impossible things can happen. We all share the opinion that the risk of nuclear weapons use is high and continues to increase. There is no need to prove it to each other. We need to discuss, at our modest level, what we could do to draw the attention of the international community to this threat. Perhaps, we should release a statement, as we do following each of our meetings. I propose the following five points.

First, we should reiterate the recent statement of the P5 on preventing nuclear war. The leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states signed this statement and they must adhere to it.

Second, it would be helpful to call upon all officials, particularly from the nuclear-weapon states, to refrain from any statements that could be misinterpreted in terms of nuclear weapons use. Such statements are contrary to the P5 joint statement on non-use of

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8 Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Corresponding member, RAS, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

nuclear weapons.

Third, we could call to resume dialogue under the New START treaty. The treaty is in force and effect. There are mechanisms in it that should be working. I believe that would help.

Fourth, we could also call to relaunch dialogue and communication on strategic stability between representatives of the United States and Russia. There are various interpretations of the Ukrainian crisis, but all of them agree that it is no longer a local conflict between Russia and Ukraine but a global crisis, involving the United States and other Western countries. That is why the discussion of strategic stability is justified.

My fifth point could seem a little abstract to you, but it is worth mentioning. I think that Russia and the United States should start planning on a New START follow-up treaty. It will at least provide some prospects.

As for other participants' statements, I would not give any recommendations to the leaders of Russia and the United States on how they should exercise their rights with respect to nuclear weapons.

# Sam NUNN

*Co-Founder, Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors and Strategic Advisor, the Nuclear Threat Initiative<sup>9</sup>*

I thank all of our Russian colleagues for this discussion and for continuing to make statements to the greatest extent you can, decrying the conflict and pointing out the dangers. And I know that many of you have done that.

I agree with Alexey that weapons of mass destruction must not be used, it's not just nuclear. I certainly identify with Bill Perry's strong statement that loose talk has greatly increased the dangers, and we need a clarification from the leaders about the recent P5 statement. And if we just leave things hanging, there are going to be many people, at least in our country and in the West, who believe there is a new Putin doctrine on nuclear weapons, that goes far beyond the previous de-facto-type understandings. Basically the new doctrine, if interpreted as interpreted by lots of people, is going to be that a nuclear power invades a non-nuclear power with conventional weapons and then threatens to use nuclear weapons to any country that interferes in that ongoing conventional conflict against a non-nuclear power. That is an extremely dangerous doctrine that makes risk go up in every direction. It makes conventional war more likely,

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<sup>9</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, former Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the US Senate.

and it also makes nuclear war more likely. So I'm hoping that there will be clarification on that point.

I would agree with Bill Potter that there is a severe setback that has occurred in terms of both norms and in terms of trust. And though I agree in principle with the outline that Igor made, I think that's going to be a very difficult road to travel. It doesn't mean we shouldn't try, but it's going to be very difficult, because trust is severely eroded, and norms have been severely eroded, unless there are clarifications. Clarifications, as Bill Perry has said, would help.

Just summarizing my view on what we mean by deterrence, I think it can be very complex, as we all know, but essentially deterrence, from my perspective, depends on three things: one is rational leaders, and second is accurate information, and third is preventing blunders. And we are in more danger of all three now than we have been in a long time.

I hope that there will be backdoor diplomacy going on. Whether there is or not, I don't know. But almost always during the Cold War crises, certainly during the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a lot of backdoor diplomacy going on. And to me the absence of that, if indeed it is not taking place, makes everything more risky, and the cyber world makes a mistake or blunder much more risky.

You know, some people believe that we should basically tackle the disputes between Ukraine and Russia before we stop the killing. I think those disputes are going to take a long time. And I would hope that we could find a way to stop the killing, stop the destruction before we try to solve every problem.

So that's my little summary, and I wish I'd heard all the remarks, but, General Dvorkin, again, thank you for your continued strong leadership.

# James ACTON

*Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program  
and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment  
for International Peace*<sup>10</sup>

I want to suggest that the statement put out by the group should focus on how to prevent the current crisis from further escalating, and ideally how to de-escalate the war, as opposed to broader issues of nuclear policy that will clearly have to be dealt with in due course. I think where we can have the most influence – and realistically that won't be very much – but I think where we could have the most influence is on the current crisis.

That's not to say that I disagree with General Dvorkin's proposals. I personally agree with more warning time. I personally agree with not having a single person to authorize nuclear use. However, I think, in the current political climate, in which Russia invaded a sovereign country, it's very hard to imagine NATO or the United States adopting sole purpose as its declaratory policy.

From that perspective I would strongly agree with Alexey Arbatov's suggestions about red lines for behavior for the US and NATO and Russia. I think those are very important suggestions. I agree with the suggestion made by various speakers that we should reiterate that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

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<sup>10</sup> Member of the International advisory council of the International Luxembourg Forum, Jessica T. Mathews Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ph.D.

As another suggestion, in his New York Times op-ed, President Biden recently stated clearly that the United States does not seek regime change in Russia. Other US officials had implied the opposite, and I think it was very helpful that President Biden spelled out clearly: no regime change. I think it would be helpful to repeat that. Reciprocally, I think it would be very helpful if President Putin publicly stated that he recognizes that Ukraine is a sovereign state. He'd have to be vague as to the borders of Ukraine, which he obviously disputes. But I think it would be very helpful if President Putin could articulate that he recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine as a political entity.

Two questions arise on this call. Firstly, in terms of analyzing the risks for escalation, if NATO does not send troops into this war, but Ukraine nonetheless is successful in starting to recapture territory in Crimea, what are the risks of Russia using nuclear weapons in that scenario?

And then secondly, in terms of possible ways out of this crisis. In January the US and NATO gave coordinated but separate proposals to Russia. The question would be if there are any proposals in those documents that Russia might be interested in exploring at an official level, that potentially could be part of some kind of settlement to this war.



# Rolf EKEUS

*Ambassador<sup>11</sup>*

**W**e now have a situation of growing security tensions in Europe.

NATO is closely watching the Ukraine situation and is a nuclear weapon organization and Russia, attacking Ukraine, is of course a nuclear weapons State.

A first problem is that we now have two nuclear weapons actors which are getting closer to a military confrontation in the Ukrainian context. That means that the situation can get close to a nuclear incident.

In this Northern/Middle Europe situation the Open Skies agreement has been one of the most important security arrangements, aiming at preventing military incidents and confrontations. It appears that it has been Putin's Russia which has given up the Open Skies, a decision which has the consequence of increasing military dangers in the Baltic Sea region, weakening military and, indeed, nuclear security.

Another seriously negative development is the cancellation (on the initiative of president Trump) of the US/Russian INF-agreement

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11 Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, former High Commissioner on National Minorities at the OSCE; Chairman of the Governing Board, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

(Intermediate Range Nuclear Force), especially its negative impact on the European dimension of nuclear weapons security and European security in general. There is no longer any dialogue between the two sides on this type of nuclear weapons, intermediate range weapons.

So we have got two events - the cancellation of Open Skies, on Russian initiative, and the closing of the INF-agreement, on American initiative, - both actions with seriously negative impact on European security - and that in a context of a full military conflict in Ukraine.

A third question I would also like to raise. We have now in front of us an important Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, opening on the first of August this year. It is a matter in this moment of total passivity and lack of energy from the Treaty's nuclear weapons States, especially Russia and the United States, with regard to concrete arms control measures. This could have an effect of spreading nuclear weapons to more and more States (the identity of which we all know).

So it is my view that it is now time to act on these three points: The Open Skies Treaty, The INF Treaty and the preparation for the NPT Review Conference.

# Vladimir LUKIN

*Professor at the National Research University –  
Higher School of Economics<sup>12</sup>*

Our discussion left one with the impression that there is a very serious mix-up of two approaches that can be put forward simultaneously by the same speaker – this is a struggle “for cleanliness and for sweeping.” Of course, we very much want to do our part in resolving the current situation and ensuring a situation free from “nuclear alarms”. But we underestimate the degree of absolute distrust of countries and peoples towards each other, and the fact that there is a raging conflict, which literally causes rage from all sides, which in turn drowns out all other feelings: a common sense, reason, and so on. General Dvorkin put forward three points. They deserve careful discussion. The third point is extremely important. It might even be of fundamental importance. But it is hard to implement in practice. We can hardly speak of a high degree of confidence when inspecting the developed and deployed within each nuclear state highly protected systems that activate the most terrible military potential to date. A wish – yes, but reality – no. This applies to a number of other things as well.

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I would like to point out that the issue of use or no nuclear use is not a static, but a dynamic factor. First, because there are very fluid thresholds between the use and non-use of nuclear weapons. This has already been partially discussed. And, secondly, there is a very important thing related to the fact that no one can distinguish between propagandist “nuclear poker”, which can be used in a variety of forms (very indirect, as you know), and real intentions. Real intentions, fortunately, are not yet visible at the level of ordinary observation, but they can be imitated.

And one more factor: the situation with “nuclear” statements and threats is closely related to the state of hostilities in the conflict that we all talk and think about. As soon as this conflict allegedly leans in one direction, one situation arises and a different one when it leans in the other direction. All these difficulties must be kept in mind when we put forward any formulations and any proposals.

One last thing. For some reason no one mentioned China today. This is a country that says firmly and clearly that it will not use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, except – in the event of a nuclear attack against it. This is China's policy. It would be right to include among our recommendations and proposals a request to China to step up its position on the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation, and if necessary, we can hold a meeting of our Forum in China, if they would desire to do so. At the moment China can take a leading and very advantageous position in the discussed matter.

# George PERKOVICH

*Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment  
for International Peace*<sup>13</sup>

One of the big reasons why the US has not released its Nuclear Posture Review yet, which was mentioned at the very beginning by General Dvorkin, is that the Posture Review plus the National Strategy were all focused primarily on China. They had been drafted and prepared, and then February 24<sup>th</sup> happened. It then seemed politically and strategically too strange to release these major documents that are focused on China, when Russia has invaded a sovereign territory in Europe. This has caused them to hold back the documents. That's just one simple point.

In the preparation of the Nuclear Posture Review, there was a lot of consideration given to adopting a sole purpose declaratory policy. That possibility was rejected for a number of reasons. We can go into those reasons, and we can debate whether there are good reasons or bad reasons, but it's been rejected. The invasion of Ukraine deepens that rejection, for a variety of reasons which Secretary Perry and others have referred to. If you have a country with nuclear weapons that has invaded a non-nuclear-weapon country and then threatened nuclear weapons against those who would come to the aid of that

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13 Member of the International advisory council of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D.

aggressed-upon country, it's deeply disturbing, especially to those who write doctrine in the US. So there is no chance, after the invasion, that there is going to be reconsideration of the sole purpose.

But that brings me to something that Mr. Lukin said that I thought was quite interesting. China does have, and always has had, a clear commitment to no first use. Of course, many American officials and others have not believed it. I think it's been China's actual position, but in any case, I would make two points. One, it's been strange that China has not said anything publicly about President Putin's rhetoric, which has threatened first use. Such threats clearly contradict China's long-standing, very firm position, but Chinese leaders have not criticized them. Now, we can understand why China hasn't done that, but even privately it does not appear that they have conveyed that making first use threats is a problem. It seems to me that this creates an opportunity to do more of what Mr. Lukin was suggesting, which is to engage with China on this and say: "rather than be quiet, this is an opportunity to strengthen calls for no first use and to have others address China's position. Does China still have a no first use policy, or not? What are the implications?" This could be worthwhile because, as bad as the current environment is with the war in Ukraine, in much of the world, meaning the United States and East Asia, the greater fear is what might happen with Taiwan and what China might do in Taiwan, where President Biden has said the US would fight for Taiwan. So those of us who worry about nuclear war, worry about Europe and say, "Well, at least NATO and the United States have said they will not directly engage in conflict with Russia." That has not been said about Taiwan and engagement with China. And so for those of us who worry about nuclear war, we have these two scenarios, these two regions, where there is a lot of concern. I think addressing in some way or engaging more with Chinese counterparts, if that's possible, would be a very good thing for us to do at some point.

Some people have suggested an alternative course. They wonder whether President Putin could be persuaded to declare a policy of

sole purpose, and if he did, whether the United States could then be pressed to do the same. After all, the Democratic Party Platform on which Joe Biden ran for president endorsed its sole purpose.

I believe most of the world would welcome it and be quite relieved if President Putin made such a statement. But, I also think President Biden's advisers would say, "This is a complete trap, and you will be destroyed politically if you agree with that. Your critics would say you are taking Putin at his word. And he's just been making threats that are contrary to that, and he's clearly an aggressor who cannot be trusted. He hasn't apologized for it, he hasn't taken these words back; he's just added a new statement, and you are a fool for echoing that." Meanwhile politicians in Japan and elsewhere, who are worried about China, would say, "Oh my god, Biden will let us fall prey to Chinese aggression, as long as it's conventional." And Taiwanese would be worried about that. And so the question would be, "Biden, what are you going to do then if China invades Taiwan? Are you saying, as long as they keep it conventional, it's theirs?" And he'll be attacked for that. I think that's what his advisors would all be saying. Now, I think personally he would be inclined to agree. But politically that's what the reaction would be in Washington and in other governments facing Russian and Chinese threats.

# Sergio DUARTE

## *President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs*<sup>14</sup>

I think that the current conflict in Ukraine contradicts the argument that nuclear deterrence prevents war, which has been widely used to justify the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of a few nations. Russia has nuclear weapons and five NATO states have such weapons in their territories. However, the war in Ukraine has not been prevented.

NATO has shown remarkable unity because of the war, in spite of the divergences between some of its members. Some states that have historically been outside the alliance, now seem eager to join it. And since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been seeking a reason to exist, and now it has found one.

Security concerns by Russia are very understandable and respectable, as are security concerns of any nation. But war is not the way to increase security. On the contrary, war only brings insecurity. The acquisition of territory by force is not permitted under international law. And the continued existence of nuclear weapons is a constant threat to the security of every nation.

So far, the nuclear taboo has worked, but we cannot know for how long.

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<sup>14</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ambassador, former United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.



Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and have engaged in conventional hostilities. It is difficult to say whether their nuclear weapons have averted a deterioration of the military situation.

It should be recalled in this context that all members of the United Nations accepted in the Charter to resolve their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in their relations.

The trouble with deterrence is that it can only fail once. And once it fails, there'll be nothing else for us to discuss.

Complacency about nuclear weapons permitted the main powers to continue developing faster and more accurate weapon systems. Countries that relinquished their nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees as well as some that harbored nuclear ambitions in the past, seem to have now second thoughts about nuclear weapons.

The architecture of disarmament and nonproliferation has eroded to a point that it seems very difficult today for the two main nuclear states to establish a productive dialogue. And even constructive results of the 10th NPT Review Conference, seem very doubtful at this stage.

In my view, there is no other way to stop the current war and prevent the use of nuclear weapons than good faith negotiations. First, to make earnest efforts to arrive at a ceasefire, then deal with the current problems, and then also for the two main powers to lead the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In 1945, the aftermath of the Second World War generated the will to establish a peaceful and collaborative system. Wise leadership at that time resulted in the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations.

The leaders of the US and Russia should make clear statements on the inadmissibility of the use of nuclear weapons. One year ago, Presidents Putin and Biden agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They also said they would initiate a robust dialogue to follow New START. It's high time that they act on that promise.

# Dmitry TRENIN

*Member, Russian International Affairs Council;  
Member, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy<sup>15</sup>*

In 2022, Russia-U.S. relations deteriorated beyond confrontation into a comprehensive hybrid war. That broader conflict has an element of a shooting war in Ukraine where Russia fights on the battlefield, and the United States participates indirectly, though increasingly actively. Such a situation has emerged for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

Unlike the Cold War-era proxy wars, which were fought on the periphery of the superpower confrontation, the conflict in Ukraine is of central importance for both Moscow and Washington. Neither side can afford to lose it. Yet, while for the United States a failure to achieve its stated goals would result in a blow to its leadership position in the Western world, for Russia, the outcome in Ukraine will be existential.

From the start of Moscow's special military operation, there have been fears of a possible use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, various scenarios of military escalation in Ukraine include crossing the nuclear threshold. Should Western arms deliveries to Ukraine begin to change the tide of war, for example, one could expect Russia striking at the transshipment points in Polish territory, thus activating Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

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<sup>15</sup> Member of the International advisory council of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D., former Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

There are other scenarios of escalation, ranging from Western-assisted Ukrainian attacks against major infrastructure assets in Russia, like the Crimean Bridge, to the arrival of NATO countries' forces in the territory of Ukraine. U.S. worries also include a major cyberattack against the nation's critical infrastructure. Intra-war nuclear deterrence, which has been in place so far, might fail under those circumstances, putting the entire world at the highest risk.

Reconfirming the Gorbachev-Reagan statement that “nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought”, which Presidents Putin and Biden already did in June 2021, and all the P-5 heads of state did again in January 2022; or pledging to give more time in response to a nuclear attack; or even ensuring that single-person authority to use nuclear weapons is ruled out are essentially designed to bar nuclear first-strike options in a situation modeled on the Cuban missile crisis. They might not work in the current environment in Ukraine.

Russia and the United States are not facing a sudden overwhelming crisis as in 1962. They are involved in a protracted conflict in which Russia's grinding advances on the ground are countered by increasing U.S.-led military and other support for Ukraine. Escalation is thus constantly spiraling up, potentially capable of crossing the nuclear threshold. Given the huge disparity in the stakes involved for Russia and the United States in Ukraine, Washington cannot win that race. Moscow can – but at a horrendous price. This harsh reality should inform decision-makers pondering their next move.

# Rule out the use of nuclear weapons as hostilities continue in Ukraine

*Online conference of the International Luxembourg Forum for Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe*

*Moscow, June 21, 2022*

All participants in the conference recognize that the danger of the use of nuclear weapons, even after an almost tenfold reduction of their arsenals as a result of the implementation of the START treaties and unilateral cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons, has significantly increased rather than diminished. Europe and the entire world have suffered gravely because of the profound crisis amid hostilities in Ukraine.

Participants in the Conference stress the importance of the Joint Statement of five nuclear-weapon states of January 3, 2022 on preventing nuclear war and averting an arms race. However, in the past few years and particularly in recent months, statements of responsible officials and influential experts quite often mention the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in an aggravated military-political environment, going beyond the generally accepted framework of deterring a nuclear attack.

The Ukrainian crisis is not a local military-political conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As more and more countries become involved in it, it is taking on a pan-European and global character. It is necessary to prevent a direct armed clash between Russia and NATO, which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

All parties should unconditionally renounce the use of any weapons of mass destruction. Non-participation of NATO armed

forces in the hostilities in Ukraine must be ensured. Russia, for its part, should refrain from striking the territory of NATO countries. All parties must make sure that the conflict does not extend to the territory of other countries. Failure to observe these conditions would open the way to a rapid escalation of the armed conflict into a direct clash of Russia and NATO and the use of nuclear weapons.

Participants in the conference consider necessary an early agreement on a cease-fire and armistice in order to save lives and prevent further destruction of cities and essential infrastructure.

In order to strengthen stability and predictability, official representatives of nuclear powers should issue statements affirming that the sole purpose of their nuclear arsenals is deterrence of a nuclear attack and, if necessary, responding to such an attack.

Measures must be taken to extend the time available to leaders of states taking decisions in response to a perceived nuclear attack. This can be done without loss of control, since the supreme bodies of government have the necessary backup channels for taking such decisions. Such measures would help to avoid errors of the information systems for early warning of missile attacks as well as misinterpretation of the information received from these systems or from other sources.

Major nuclear powers should adopt political decisions and organizational-technical measures ruling out single-person authority to decide on the use of nuclear weapons.

Concurrently, a number of provisions of the major powers' nuclear doctrines causing concern of other countries should be clarified.

Participants in the conference call for:

- resuming bilateral U.S.–Russia dialogue on strategic stability;
- launching consultations regarding the main parameters of a follow-on to the New START treaty;
- making every effort to intensify constructive dialogue within the framework of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**  
**Online Supervisory Board Meeting**  
**of the International Luxembourg Forum**  
**on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe**

**December 1, 2020**

1. **James ACTON** Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ph.D. (USA).
2. **Alexey ARBATOV** Deputy Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum; Head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Academician, RAS (Russia).
3. **Sergio DUARTE** President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ambassador (former United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) (Brazil).
4. **Vladimir DVORKIN** Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum; Principal Researcher at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor, Ph.D.; Major General (ret.) (Russia).

5. **Rolf EKEUS** Ambassador, Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum (former High Commissioner on National Minorities at the OSCE; Chairman of the Governing Board, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) (Sweden).
6. **Viktor ESIN** Research Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies of National Security of Russia, Expert Institute of the National Research University «Higher School of Economics»; First Vice-President of the Academy of Security, Defense and Law and Order (former Chief of Staff – First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Missile Forces); Professor, Ph.D.; Colonel General (retired) (Russia).
7. **Igor IVANOV** President of the Russian International Affairs Council; Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum (former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Minister of the Foreign Affairs); Corresponding member, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia).
8. **Robert LEGVOLD** Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and the Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Ph.D. (USA).

9. **Vladimir LUKIN** Professor, National Research University – Higher School of Economics; Member of the Supervisory Board, International Luxembourg Forum (former Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs; President of the Russian Paralympic Committee; Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Russian Federation; Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States of America; Commissioner on Human Rights for the Russian Federation) (Russia).
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11. **Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV** Deputy Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Luxembourg Forum; Head of Division for Military-Political Analysis, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Director, Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Ph.D. (Russia).



12. **William PERRY** Professor of the Stanford University, Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum (former Secretary of the US Department of Defense) (USA).
13. **George PERKOVICH** Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Ph.D. (USA).
14. **William POTTER** Director, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies; Professor of Non-Proliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey; Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D. (USA).
15. **Roald SAGDEEV** Distinguished Professor of the Department of Physics at the University of Maryland; Director Emeritus, Space Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum; Academician, RAS (Russia/USA).
16. **Dmitry TRENIN** Member, Russian International Affairs Council; Member, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Russia).





